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Abstract
The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly
unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in tradi-
tional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new
literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a
group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a
preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and
the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the re-
sult is logically inconsistent in the case of the discursive paradox, it
is not stable with respect to the level of aggregation in the case of
the Ostrogorski paradox. In the following I argue that, despite these
differences, the two problems have a similar structure. My conclusion
will be twofold: on the one hand, the similarities between the para-
doxes support the claim that these problems should be tackled us-
ing the same aggregation procedure; on the other hand, applying the
same procedure to these paradoxes will help clarifying the strength
and weakness of the aggregation method itself. More specifically, I
will show that an operator defined in artificial intelligence to merge
belief bases can deal with both paradoxes.
1 Introduction
Consider a group of individuals where each member makes a judgment on
several issues. The judgments have a binary form, i.e. each issue can only
be accepted (yes, 1) or rejected (no, 0). The issues are not independent,
the acceptance or rejection of some propositions entails the acceptance or
rejection of other propositions. Suppose now that all the individuals express
a judgment on each issue fulfilling the constraints of interdependence between
them. Problems arise when the adopted aggregation procedure selects a
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collective outcome that does not satisfy the interdependencies between the
propositions.
This is the case for two paradoxes: the Ostrogorski paradox (Daudt and
Rae 1976, Kelly 1989) and the discursive dilemma (Brennan 2001, Korn-
hauser 1992, Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993).2 The paradoxical character
consists in a disturbing conflict between individual and collective rationality:
despite the fact that the group members rationally express their judgments
(each individual is aware of the interdependence of the propositions and
expresses her opinion accordingly), the group outcome – selected by what
appears to be a reasonable aggregation procedure – violates these interde-
pendence relations.
While the Ostrogorski paradox is a voting paradox traditionally studied
in social choice theory, the discursive dilemma is a new aggregation paradox
attracting the interest of scholars in economics, political philosophy, logic
and (more recently) social epistemology (Goldman 2004a, List 2005b). Re-
lationships between these two problems and the more familiar paradox of
preference aggregation in social choice theory have been investigated. In
particular, Bezembinder and van Acker (1985) proved that in every instance
of the Ostrogorski paradox there is an underlying Condorcet paradox3, and
List and Pettit (2002) showed that the discursive paradox is a generalization
of the paradox of voting. As in the Condorcet paradox, the collective out-
come is (in some respect) inconsistent, despite of the individual inputs being
consistent. The result is not stable with respect to the level of aggregation
in the Ostrogorski paradox, and it is logically inconsistent in the case of the
discursive paradox.
Judgment aggregation is the name of the emerging research area that
studies the problems of combining individual judgments on logically inter-
connected propositions into a social judgment on the same propositions. On
the pages of this journal Alvin Goldman (2004a) and Christian List (2005b)
have developed a judgment aggregation framework for the analysis of in-
stitutions in social epistemology. In this paper I will claim that judgment
aggregation should not be limited to the investigation of aggregation para-
doxes on logically interconnected propositions, but it should also include
compound decision problems like the Ostrogorski paradox. In fact, despite
the differences, I will show that the latter and the discursive paradox have a
similar structure.
In a previous work (Pigozzi 2005) I have illustrated how the inconsistent
result of the discursive dilemma can be avoided when we apply an operator
defined in artificial intelligence for the merging of belief bases. On the basis of
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the similarities I will here apply the same merging operator to the Ostrogorski
paradox, showing that this inconsistent outcome can also be prevented. The
discussion will be informal and conceptual rather than technical.4 Finally,
the application of the same aggregation procedure to these paradoxes will
help to clarify the strength and weakness of the aggregation method itself.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 I introduce the discursive
paradox and show how the inconsistent results are avoided when we apply one
specific merging operator to the discursive dilemma. In Section 3 I explain
in what way the Ostrogorski paradox is structurally similar to the discursive
dilemma, and how we can prevent counterintuitive outcomes by applying a
merging operator to this problem as well. In Section 4 I outline an alternative
approach to deal with aggregation paradoxes like the two investigated in the
present paper.
2 The discursive dilemma
Suppose that a hiring committee in a higher education institution appoints
a candidate (proposition S) if and only if either the candidate is good at
teaching (P ) and at fund raising (Q) or she is good at research (R). This
complex decision rule can be formally expressed as ((P ∧Q)∨R)↔ S. The
logical connectives among the propositions make the judgments on P,Q,R
(also called the premises) and S (the conclusion) interdependent. For exam-
ple, if a member of the committee is in favour of hiring a candidate despite
the fact that she is bad at teaching, fund raising and research, that member
would be irrational, since her judgment set is inconsistent. A judgment set is
(logically) consistent when the judgments on the propositions are consistent
according to classical propositional logic.
Assume now that each member of the hiring committee makes a consistent
judgment on the propositions P , Q, R and S, and that the individual judg-
ments are combined into a collective one via propositionwise majority voting,
viz. the collective judgment on each proposition is the majority judgment
on that proposition. A discursive paradox can emerge when the combination
of consistent individual judgments is an inconsistent collective outcome. An
example of a discursive paradox with a five-member (K1, K2, . . . K5) hiring
committee is shown in the table below.
P : the candidate is good at teaching
Q: the candidate is good at fund raising
R: the candidate is good at research
S: the candidate is appointed
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((P ∧Q) ∨R)↔ S
P Q R S
K1 0 1 0 0
K2 0 1 0 0
K3 1 0 0 0
K4 1 1 1 1
K5 1 1 1 1
m 1 1 0 0
A majority (m) in the committee believes both P and Q to be true and
R and S to be false, which is an inconsistent collective set of judgments,
since it violates the decision rule ((P ∧Q) ∨R)↔ S. This is an example of
the discursive dilemma. Let us now turn to an alternative approach to the
aggregation of judgment that avoids the inconsistent outcomes.
2.1 Belief merging applied to the discursive dilemma
In order to escape the paradox, two procedures have been suggested. One
procedure is to let each member publicly vote on each premise and proceed
to appoint the candidate only if a majority of the members believes that the
candidate is good at teaching and at fund raising or if a majority believes that
the candidate is good at research (this is called the premise-based procedure).
The second procedure is that each member decides about P , Q and R and
then publicly casts her vote on the conclusion S only if she believes that the
candidate is good at teaching and at fund raising or she believes that the
candidate is good at research (this is called the conclusion-based procedure).
If the latter procedure is followed, the candidate will be appointed if and
only if a majority of the committee voted for S.
Both standard procedures proposed to generate consistent judgments may
appear unsatisfactory: conclusion-based voting generates incomplete judg-
ments (by being silent on the premises), and premise-based voting prioritizes
some propositions (the premises) over others (the conclusion). A natural
procedure to generate consistent and complete judgment sets without any
prioritization is to apply a merging operator, initially introduced in artificial
intelligence to merge several finite sets (bases) of propositions. The justifi-
cation for this move is that belief merging and group decision-making share
a similar difficulty, viz. the definition of procedures that produce collective
belief from individual belief bases, and operators that produce a collective
decision from individual decisions.
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One of the major problems in contemporary artificial intelligence is the
aggregation of finite sets of propositions. In many applications it is necessary
to merge beliefs from different and potentially conflicting sources in order to
obtain a collective belief representation (an example is the definition of an
expert system from a group of human experts). The outcome of a merging
process is a consistent set that integrates (parts of) the initial bases. When
the individual bases are mutually consistent, the collective outcome can easily
be constructed: it is the union of the individual belief bases. Things are more
challenging when the individual belief bases are in conflict with each other.
Formally, a belief base Ki is a finite set of propositional formulas repre-
senting the explicit beliefs of the individual i. For example, if the individual
i believes that the propositions P and Q are true, the corresponding belief
base is Ki = {P ∧ Q}. A merging operator combines various and possibly
conflicting belief bases. An example of three individuals with conflicting be-
liefs about the propositions P and Q is: K1 = {P ∧ ¬Q}, K2 = {¬P ∧ Q}
and K3 = {¬P ∧ ¬Q}.
Beliefs are often interconnected. It is easy to imagine examples where the
propositions P and Q above cannot both be true. It can be something on
which all the individuals of the group agree, or they know it is true (e.g., the
same person cannot be in two different places at the same time). It can also
express a condition accepted by all the members (e.g. we cannot go both to
the cinema and to the theatre tonight). In both cases, we require that also
the collective outcome satisfies this condition. These kinds of conditions are
called integrity constraints (IC).
Let us now go back to the five-member hiring committee example. There,
the only IC is the rule that states that the candidate will be appointed only
if she is good at teaching and at fund raising or she is good at research, i.e.
((P ∧ Q) ∨ R) ↔ S. We have seen that the discursive paradox arises when
the aggregation of consistent individual judgments sets (that is, judgments
that satisfy the IC) is an inconsistent social judgment set (that is, a col-
lective judgment that fails to satisfy the IC). The merging operator avoids
inconsistent results by imposing the IC on the collective outcomes.
In order to distinguish the consistent outcomes from the inconsistent ones,
we need to introduce two concepts from elementary logic: the notions of
interpretation and model. An interpretation is an assignment of a truth
value (0/false or 1/true) to each propositional variable, and it is represented
as the list of these binary evaluations: for instance, given four propositional
variables P , Q, R and S, the vector (1,0,0,0) stands for the interpretation in
which P is true and Q, R and S are each false. An interpretation determines
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a unique truth value for any (possibly compound) proposition: for instance,
under the interpretation (1,1,0,1), Q ∧ R is false and ((P ∧ Q) ∨ R) ↔ S is
true. Finally, an interpretation is a model of a propositional formula if and
only if it makes the formula true in the usual classical truth functional way.
For example, the interpretation (1,1,0,1) is a model of ((P ∧ Q) ∨ R) ↔ S,
but it is not a model of Q ∧R. Conversely, the set of models of a formula is
the set of all the interpretations that make that formula true. For instance,
the set of models of P ∨Q is {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}.
In order to define a merging operator we need to specify how the belief
bases are combined into a collective one. We can anticipate that a collective
outcome under the new aggregation procedure is a model of the IC (i.e. a
consistent truth value assignment to the premises and to the conclusion in
discursive paradox terms).
Let E = (K1, K2, . . . , Kn) be a finite collection of belief bases Ki each
representing an individual judgment set.5 The aggregation rule ∆ is a func-
tion that assigns a collective belief base (which corresponds to a consistent
collective judgment set) to the IC and to E. The result is denoted by ∆EIC .
Several types of merging operators have already been proposed in the
literature. The one used here is intended to reflect the view of the majority,
by maximizing the level of total agreement among the individuals. This is
also the operator that behaves most similarly to the propositionwise major-
ity voting adopted in the discursive dilemma (and, as we will see, in the
Ostrogorski paradox).6
Intuitively, the models of the merged bases are models of IC, which are
preferred according to some distance measure. The so-defined merging op-
erator chooses the outcome so as to minimize its sum of distances to the
individual bases. The distance measure Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez use is the
widely known Dalal’s distance (Dalal 1988a, 1988b) between two interpreta-
tions. According to this measure, the distance between two interpretations
is equal to the number of the propositional variables in which two interpreta-
tions differ. For example, w = (1, 1, 0, 1) and w′ = (1, 0, 1, 1) are two models
of ((P ∧Q)∨R)↔ S, and the distance between w and w′ is 2 (as they assign
a different truth value to Q and to R, while they agree on P and S being
true).
We are now ready to apply the belief merging to the five-member com-
mittee problem. E is (K1, K2, K3, K4, K5), where each Ki is the belief base
of a member of the hiring committee, and IC = {((P ∧Q) ∨R)↔ S}. The
merging procedure takes each individual judgment set as a belief base. Each
6
individual makes a judgment over the atomic propositions P , Q, R and S
that satisfies the IC. We can therefore write:
K1 = K2 = {¬P,Q,¬R,¬S}
K3 = {P,¬Q,¬R,¬S}
K4 = K5 = {P,Q,R, S}
The model of K1 and K2 is (0, 1, 0, 0), the model of K3 is (1, 0, 0, 0) and
the model of K4 and K5 is (1, 1, 1, 1).
The table below shows the result of the IC majority merging operator on
E = (K1, K2, K3, K4, K5). In the first column are all the models of IC. The
numbers in the columns K1, K2, K3, K4 and K5 are the Dalal’s distances
of each Ki from the respective model. Finally, the last column contains
the sum of the numbers expressing the distance between the corresponding
interpretation on the four propositions and each belief base Ki in E.
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 ∆
E
IC
(1,1,1,1) 3 3 3 0 0 9
(1,1,0,1) 2 2 2 1 1 8
(1,0,1,1) 4 4 2 1 1 12
(1,0,0,0) 2 2 0 3 3 10
(0,1,1,1) 2 2 4 1 1 10
(0,1,0,0) 0 0 2 3 3 8
(0,0,1,1) 3 3 3 2 2 13
(0,0,0,0) 1 1 1 4 4 11
Only the models in the first column of the table are the available candi-
dates for the collective judgments. The merging operator selects the models
associated with the total minimum distance value (that is, 8). These are
(1, 1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0, 0) (in the rows with a shaded background), which is
tantamount to saying that the collective outcome is a tie. This result can
be interpreted by saying that we do not have enough information to select
a unique collective judgment. We therefore avoid the inconsistency at the
price of indecision.
We now turn to the Ostrogorski paradox and show how this has a similar
structure with the discursive paradox, thus justifying the application of the
belief merging operator also to this problem.
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3 The Ostrogorski paradox
Let us consider a two-party system (government and opposition) and three
issues (economic, environmental, international). The two parties have oppo-
site views on the issues, and each individual casts a vote (1 or 0) depending
on whether she wishes a policy change on that issue (so she agrees with the
opposition on that issue), or the government represents her opinion on that
matter (no policy change). Suppose there are five voters and that they vote
as in the table below:
Econ Env Int Party
K1 0 1 0 0
K2 0 1 0 0
K3 1 0 0 0
K4 1 1 1 1
K5 1 1 1 1
m 1 1 0 0
The table has the same structure as the one used in the five-members
hiring committee example of the discursive paradox. The propositions P , Q,
R and S are now replaced by the three issues and the party. The aggregation
method in the Ostrogorski paradox is different. If in the discursive dilemma
the relationships among the propositions P , Q, R and S were of a logical
kind, the Ostrogorski paradox is a compound majority decision. Each voter
votes for the government (resp. opposition) if she agrees with the government
(resp. opposition) on a majority of the issues.
Like the discursive paradox, the Ostrogorski case is puzzling because,
despite the individuals being rational, the collective outcome is inconsistent.
If each voter votes for the party with which she agrees on a majority of issues,
the government wins. However, the opposition represents the views of the
majority of the voters on every issue (specifically on the economic and the
environmental policy).
The argumentative structure of the Ostrogorski paradox is similar to the
premises-conclusion structure of the discursive dilemma. Here an individual
votes for the government (opposition) if and only if she agrees with the
government (opposition) on at least two of the three issues. As we have
seen, in the discursive paradox a member of the committee would appoint
a candidate (S) if and only if she believes that the candidate is good at
teaching (P ) and at fund raising (Q) or the candidate is good at research
(R). A candidate can be appointed (S true) for various reasons (R is believed
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to be true by at least three members in the committee, or both P and Q
are believed to be true by a majority in the committee). Similarly, in the
Ostrogorski paradox the reasons to vote for the government (opposition)
could be one among several judgment sets on the three issues (0,0,0), (0,0,1),
(0,1,0), etc. (respectively (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), etc. for the opposition).
However, there are two differences between the paradoxes. The first is
that in the Ostrogorski case the individuals are asked to vote, not to make
a judgment in the form of true/false on some propositions. The individ-
uals may cast their votes depending on their desires without committing
themselves to a truth-conducive vote.7 The second difference is that in the
Ostrogorski paradox the issues and the parties are not logically connected
(as the propositions in the discursive paradox are). It is rather a majority
rule on the issues that determines which party an individual should vote for:
the individual votes for the party she is in agreement with on the majority
of the issues.
The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are two problems
arising when individual consistent votes and judgments are combined into
a social decision. The interdependence of the propositions in the two para-
doxes are not of the same kind. In the Ostrogorski paradox it is a compound
majority decision that binds parties and issues, whereas in the discursive
dilemma the relationship among propositions is purely logical. The depen-
dence relations are different, however, the reason for the paradoxes arising
is that in both cases the majority is applied at different levels, as the figure
below illustrates.
Let F be a variable for the two functions that assign the appropriate
value 0 or 1 to the conclusion S (resp. the party), given the values for the
premises (resp. the issues). F is the compound majority decision rule in
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the Ostrogorski problem, and the truth value function that associates 1 to
S if and only if (P ∧Q) ∨R is true in the discursive paradox. Let m be the
majority rule. The paradoxes arise because the function F on the premises
(issues) that received the greater support (i.e., F (m(•), . . . ,m(•))) is not
necessarily the same as the majority voting applied to the function’s value
of the conclusion (party) (i.e., m(F (•))).
3.1 Belief merging applied to the Ostrogorski paradox
I will now show how the inconsistent result of the Ostrogorski paradox can
as well be avoided when we apply the majority merging operator introduced
in the previous section.
Individual preferences can be represented as binary vectors. For example,
in the Ostrogorski paradox the individuals K1 and K2 wish a change only on
the environmental issue. The corresponding binary vector for K1 and K2 is
therefore (0, 1, 0, 0). The voter K3 wishes a change only with regard to the
economic issue, but is happy with the government on both the environmental
and the international policies and, therefore, votes for the government. K3’s
preferences are represented by (1, 0, 0, 0). Finally, K4 andK5 vote for a policy
change on all the three issues and, consequently, they vote for the opposition.
Their preferences can be expressed by (1, 1, 1, 1).
The set of the permissible social outcomes, i.e. those outcomes where
a party is elected only if it accumulated the majority on the issues, is the
following:
{(1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)}
These are in the first column of the table below. When we apply the
majority belief merging we obtain the following result.
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 ∆
E
IC
(1,1,1,1) 3 3 3 0 0 9
(1,1,0,1) 2 2 2 1 1 8
(1,0,1,1) 4 4 2 1 1 12
(1,0,0,0) 2 2 0 3 3 10
(0,1,1,1) 2 2 4 1 1 10
(0,1,0,0) 0 0 2 3 3 8
(0,0,1,0) 2 2 2 3 3 12
(0,0,0,0) 1 1 1 4 4 11
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We can notice that it is the same table as the hiring committee example,
with the difference that the binary valuation (0, 0, 1, 1) is not any longer an
outcome allowed by the compound majority rule in the Ostrogorski para-
dox, and it has been replaced by (0, 0, 1, 0). In fact, F (0, 0, 1) = 1 when
F is the function that assigns a truth value to S given that S is equivalent
to (P ∧ Q) ∨ R. But F (0, 0, 1) = 0 when F is the majority rule used in
the Ostrogorski paradox. Nevertheless the final outcome is not affected by
this change, since the two solutions that minimize the distances are again
(1, 1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0, 0), with minimum distance 8.
4 Floating conclusions
The Ostrogorski paradox (resp. the discursive dilemma) treats the issues
and the party (resp. premises and conclusions) on which the individuals are
requested to vote (resp. make their judgments) in an even handed manner.
Hence the difference between those propositions that are ‘premises’ (‘issues’)
and those that are ‘conclusions’ (‘party’) vanishes. The same is true for
belief merging, the approach I have argued for: the distance between two
interpretations is the number of propositions on which the two interpretations
differ, regardless whether they assign a different value to a premise (issue)
or to a conclusion (party). (It is indeed worth mentioning that - if the
inconsistent outcomes were not excluded by IC - the distance-based belief
merging operator would assign the minimum distance exactly to the same
inconsistent result found via propositionwise majority voting.)
However, the two paradoxes considered here have an argumentative struc-
ture; the judgments and the votes on some propositions constrain the judg-
ments and the votes on other propositions. I sketch here a possible framework
to refer to if we really intend to grant that these propositions are of a differ-
ent type, and we therefore want to maintain the argumentative structure of
the two paradoxes.
The problem of finding a unique reason for a decision likewise arises in
the theory of defeasible inheritance nets (Horty et al. 1990, Horty 1994).
There, Makinson and Schlechta (1991) first studied the floating conclusion
phenomenon, which became relevant also in argument systems. A conclu-
sion is floating when it can be supported by two different and potentially
incompatible arguments. Floating conclusions can be traced in the discursive
dilemma and in the Ostrogorski paradox. In the first paradox the conclusion
(S) to hire a candidate can be accepted, for example, because P and Q are
believed to be true, or because R is believed to be true. Similarly, in the Os-
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trogorski paradox a party can win when supported by different combinations
of issues.
The theory of defeasible inheritance nets deals with the problem that a
belief base can be associated with multiple extensions (an extension repre-
sents some total set of arguments), and it is not clear which extension one
should adopt. The two solutions proposed for this problem are the credulous
and the skeptical approaches. The credulous approach consists in accepting
the set of conclusions endorsed by an arbitrary argument extension. The
skeptical approach considers the intersection of the extensions (Horty 2002).
Moreover, Makinson and Schlechta observed that there are two ways to per-
form a skeptical solution. We can either intersect the arguments, or we can
intersect the conclusions. These two skeptical approaches can yield different
results, since a statement may be supported in each extension, but only by
different and possibly conflicting arguments (floating conclusion). In the lit-
erature no final agreement has yet been reached about whether we should
always endorse a floating conclusion or not.
An example that illustrates that the two skeptical approaches lead to two
different conclusions is the famous Horty’s inheritance example. Suppose
that John wants to buy a very expensive yacht but he does not have all the
money. His parents are very sick and about to die within a month. He has a
brother and sister, equally reliable. His brother tells him that their mother
will leave half a million dollars to him but their father will give that amount
to John. On the other hand, his sister tells him that their mother will leave
half a million dollars to John and their father will leave that amount to her.
Horty concludes that if John were to intersect the arguments, he would
not be justified in concluding that he is about to inherit half a million dol-
lars. But if he were to follow the second skeptical strategy (intersecting the
conclusions), he would be justified in drawing the conclusion that he is about
to inherit all that money, and so he could place the deposit for the yacht.
Indeed, both his brother’s and his sister’s arguments, though contradicting
each other, support the conclusion that John will inherit half a million dollars
either from his father or from his mother.
When we count (as we do in the aggregation paradoxes) how many people
in a group voted for a certain conclusion or for a certain party, we ignore
the reasons supporting that decision. The literature on floating conclusions
shows that splitting a set of arguments into reasons and conclusions, and
‘aggregating’ them separately, can lead to opposing consequences. I believe
that the research done on defeasible inheritance nets can shed new light on
the area of judgment aggregation. I plan to investigate this relation in a
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future paper.
5 Conclusions
This paper aimed at showing that a voting paradox and a judgment aggre-
gation paradox have a similar structure. The common feature is that in both
cases group members have to express a judgment or cast a vote on several
interconnected items.
The rules that make the items interdependent are of a different kind.
In the discursive paradox it is a logical rule; the propositions are logically
connected and the individual as well as the collective judgment sets are as-
sumed to be logically consistent. The truth values assigned to the premises
entail the truth or falsity of the conclusion. In the Ostrogorski paradox the
individual and collective choices on the issues determine which party that
person and the group support. In both paradoxes the values assigned to
some propositions (premises in the case of the discursive paradox, issues in
the Ostrogorski paradox) dictate the individual and collective values on other
propositions (conclusions and parties, respectively).
The difficulty with the aggregation problems is that the set of proposi-
tions on which most group members agree is not guaranteed to be a candidate
for the collective decision. The set can fail to satisfy the dependence rela-
tions among the items even though each member consistently expressed her
judgments or votes.
One way to avoid this undesirable result is to require that the social out-
come satisfies the consistency requirements as the individual bases do. This
is achieved by rejecting the inconsistent results from the set of candidates
of the aggregation procedure. I have elsewhere claimed (Pigozzi 2005) that
judgment aggregation and belief merging are related in an interesting way,
and that more exchange between these two areas of research is definitely
desirable. A majoritarian IC merging operator for belief bases has been
applied to the discursive paradox, and this proved to prevent the paradox.
The value of the merging procedure rests upon the exclusion of inconsistent
sets of judgments from the set of the candidates apt to become collective
judgments, and in the definition of a preference order (induced by a distance
measure) on the remaining candidates.
Relying on the similarities between the discursive dilemma and the Os-
trogorski paradox, the same merging operator has been applied to the latter
dilemma in the present paper. The application of the merging procedure is
13
not the only consequence that can be driven from the observation of the sim-
ilarities between the two paradoxes. Though the Ostrogorski paradox cannot
be strictly defined as a judgment aggregation paradox, the recognition that
the cause of the puzzling results resides in which order the majority rule
and the specific aggregation function is applied, should make them be recog-
nized as part of a larger class of aggregation problems. Therefore, judgment
aggregation should not be restricted to a particular structure of judgment
aggregation problems, where the dependence relations are of a logical type,
but be broadened to include other types of dependencies.
In the last section I sketched a possible alternative approach to the ag-
gregation problems. This makes use of some of the discussions on floating
conclusions in the area of defeasible inheritance nets. This framework can be
interesting for those who believe that an aggregation that handles the items
to be combined as of the same kind can be unjustified when dealing with
problems as those that we have addressed here.
The discursive dilemma and the Ostrogorski paradox occur because the
aggregations on the premises (issues) and on the conclusion (party) go in
two divergent directions. On the one hand, the premises that receive the
highest degree of support cannot consistently provide reasons for the most
popular conclusion (party). On the other hand, the socially selected conclu-
sion cannot be inferred from the premises that received the majority of the
votes.
The need for a unique set of reasons for a certain decision is shared by the
multiple extensions problem in defeasible inheritance nets. There, Makinson
and Schlechta have baptized ‘floating conclusions’ the phenomenon according
to which a conclusion is supported by some arguments contained in every
extension but there exists no argument in all the extensions that supports
that conclusion. I believe that the interplay between aggregation problems
and defeasible inheritance nets is worth being investigated. I leave this to
future research plans.
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2For a comprehensive bibliography of the rapidly growing body of litera-
ture on the discursive paradox, see List (2005a).
3Also known as the paradox of voting, it is named after the Marquis de
Condorcet, who in 1770 proposed a method for the aggregation of preferences.
It shows that individual transitive preferences can lead to an intransitive
social outcome.
4The formal definition of the merging operator can be found in Konieczny
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discursive paradox.
5The order of the Kis is not relevant.
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